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stant case as a rejection of explicit and implicit racial classifications as
standards to invalidate state action on equal protection grounds, he
would not be entirely correct. The Court was clear in stating that the
facts of the principal case did not meet the requirements of either an
explicit or implicit racial classification.30 This clarity of expression by
the Court precludes misinterpretating this decision as a justification for
continued enforcement of existing law which would otherwise be uncon-
stitutional or interpreting the instant case as a license to frame laws that
perpetuate the ghetto.31
GARY S. SORTOR
SUPREME COURT DECLINES ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
IN LAKE ERIE POLLUTION CASE
As water pollution problems continue to mount, citizens and states
are seeking effective remedies. The State of Ohio sought to invoke the
original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court in a complaint
praying for an injunction against three non-resident chemical companies,'
located in Michigan and Canada, which had allegedly created a public
nuisance by dumping poisonous mercury into Lake Erie and its tribu-
taries. The Supreme Court held, Ohio's motion for leave to file a bill of
complaint denied. Discretionary original jurisdiction was declined be-
cause the issues were bottomed on local nuisance principles involving no
federal law. Furthermore, the majority of eight reasoned that even with
the aid of a court appointed special master, they would be ill equipped
to act as a trial court. Several competent governmental agencies were
already involved in the problem of the pollution of Lake Erie, and, if
Ohio still wishes to seek injunctive relief and damages, Ohio courts can
obtain jurisdiction.' Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 91 S. Ct. 1005
(1971).
30. James v. Valtierra, 91 S. Ct. 1331, 1333 (1971), where the Court noted that Califor-
nia's article XXXIV does not rest on "distinctions based on race . . . [and that the record]
.. . would not support any claim that a law seemingly neutral on its face is in fact aimed
at a racial minority."
31. By this point in history it should be obvious that discrimination is a major cause
of the problems facing ghetto inhabitants. See Comment, Decent Housing as a Constitutional-
Right, 42 U.S.C. § 1893 Poor People's Remedy for Deprivation, 14 How. L.J. 338 (1968);
Comment, Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for a National Tenants' Association, 47
T.x. L. Rav. 1160 (1969).
1. The defendant companies were Wyandotte Chemicals Corporation, Dow Chemical
Company, and Dow Chemical Company of Canada, Ltd.
2. Justice Douglas filed a lone dissent, arguing a special master with the aid of a panel
of scientific advisors could overcome the difficulties presented by the complex technical




Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction "shall extend . . . to controversies be-
tween a state and citizens of another state . . . and between a state
and foreign . . . citizens or subjects." Section 2, clause 2 further grants
"original jurisdiction in all cases in which a state shall be a party," but
the United States Code specifically states such jurisdiction shall be
"original but not exclusive."' 3 Since the Court's inception only 132 deci-
sions have arisen through the operation of original jurisdiction. As the
Supreme Court has evolved into primarily the final federal appellate
court, the appearance of original jurisdiction has become extremely rare.4
The grant of original jurisdiction has been traced to a desire by the
framers of the Constitution to provide a forum for the adjustment of in-
terstate differences5 without "the partiality, or suspicion of partiality,
which might exist if the plaintiff State were compelled to resort to the
courts of the State of which the defendants were citizens." 6 An early
view held that the sole criteria for invoking original jurisdiction was the
nature of the parties." Later, the Court excluded cases with political
overtones" and cases involving the enforcement of a state's penal
statutes.9
The bulk of the Court's early litigation founded on original jurisdic-
tion appears to have involved boundary squabbles.'" Then, in the early
part of this century, several cases arose involving actions by states to
abate nuisances originating in other states." Clear-cut limitations were
soon placed on the use of original jurisdiction, and the Court has con-
sistently tightened these restrictions as its appellate docket has grown.
A state seeking relief under original jurisdiction must generally aver
injury to state proprietary interests in support of its motion for leave to
file a complaint."2 Apart from specific injury, a state may also sue as
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970).
4. Only about two cases per term out of a docket of over 3,000 cases are founded on
the Court's original jurisdiction, and these have mostly been submerged lands disputes.
See The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77, 98-109 (1958); The Supreme
Court, 1969 Term, 84 HAv. L. REV. 1, 247-55 (1970).
5. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S.
439 (1945).
6. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1888).
7. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote:
If these be the parties, it is entirely unimportant, what may be the subject of con-
troversy. Be it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into
the courts of the Union.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821).
8. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 475 (1866).
9. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
10. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (dictum). See generally Note, The Original
Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STaN. L. REV. 665 (1959).
11. New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); New York v. New Jersey,
256 U.S. 296 (1921); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
12. United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926) (bill to cancel patents issued
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parens patriae's if the state is a real and substantial party to the litiga-
tion.14 In Missouri v. Illinois,15 Missouri sought to enjoin Illinois from
discharging sewage into interstate waters. The Court held that Missouri
was a proper party to the suit since the health and comfort of its citi-
zens was endangered and individual suits by citizens themselves would
be inadequate. This standard was extended in Georgia v. Tennessee Cop-
per Co.'8 to necessitate a showing not only that the entire body of the
complaining state's citizens be affected, but also that the citizens have
no remedy in another forum. If individual relief was impossible and the
state brought the suit, the Court demanded a high standard of proof
of the nuisance since the acts complained of were usually those of a
sovereign state.' 7
The high standard of proof requirement appears to be the first sign
of uneasiness with the use of original jurisdiction in interstate nuisance
abatement controversies. The aggrieved state in most of the nuisance
disputes has sought to achieve a solution through localized legal action
or conferences before resorting to the extraordinary remedy of an orig-
inal jurisdiction suit. The Court has nonetheless continually underscored
its lack of competence in complex interstate trials:
We cannot withhold the suggestion, inspired by the considera-
tion of this case, that the grave problem of sewage disposal
presented by the large and growing populations living on the
shores of New York Bay is one more likely to be wisely solved
by coiperative study and by conference and mutual concession
on the part of representatives of the States so vitally interested
in it than by proceedings in any court however constituted.'8
Where possible, the Supreme Court has dismissed actions when an alter-
native forum has been available.'
In denying Ohio's motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, the
majority's reasoning rested on the presence of a plethora of official bodies
already investigating mercury contamination of Lake Erie. Although not
labelled as such, it seems as if the Wyandotte Court applied the equitable
principle of declining jurisdiction in a case where not all available
remedies have been exhausted.
under Swamp Lands Acts) ; Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S. 290 (1907) (bill to account
for a debt); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838) (bill to establish
a boundary).
13. "[Tlrustee, guardian or representative of all her citizens." Louisiana v. Texas, 176
U.S. 1, 19 (1900). See also Note, 39 HARV. L. REV. 1084-88 (1926).
14. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
15. Id.
16. 206 U.S. 230 (1906).
17. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) cited in Wyandotte at 1011.
18. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921).
19. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939), where a lower federal court had




-A *Michigan -court had enjoined Wyandotte from -discharging mer-
cury into Lake Erie, and both Wyandotte and Dow Canada were under
close scrutiny by Michigan and Ontario water resource commissions.
Additionally, Ohio and Michigan participated in a federal conference
concerning the pollution of the lake. Lake Erie is also subject to the
supervision of the International Joint Commission, established by the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, relating to the boundaries between
the United States and Canada.20 The existence of this myriad number
of agencies and other courts persuaded the reluctant Court to stay out of
this already crowded sphere. Yet, as Justice Douglas' dissent indicated,
many claim that little, if anything, was actually being accomplished by
these bodies.2 '
Obviously there is a great need for a unified frontal approach to
water pollution commensurate with the gravity of the problem in Lake
Erie. However, the Court clearly stated it had neither the time nor the
expertise to adjudicate pollution problems which are styled as public
nuisances. Paradoxically, an original jurisdiction suit could be the least
effective method of cleaning up Lake Erie. Although Justice Douglas
places great confidence in using a special master with scientific advisors,
historically, final adjudication has been painfully slow in coming in such
cases: the final disposition in the New York v. New Jersey sewage dis-
pute came thirteen years after the first papers were filed in Washington.22
Thus, in the long run, the Court, by granting Ohio's motion to file a bill
of complaint, could have done more harm to Lake Erie by increasing ad-
ministrative delays in finding a solution to the problem. Parenthetically,
the time which the Court would spend on this problem would of necessity
also detract from the Court's "paramount role as the supreme federal
appellate court.123
The Court went to great length to draw attention to the "changes
in the American legal system and the development of American society"2"
'which have rendered original jurisdiction obsolete and which have pro-
moted "the enhanced importance of our role as the final federal appel-
late court.125 Evolutionary developments far beyond the purview of the
20. Treaty with Great Britain relating to boundary waters between the United States
and Canada, January 11, 1901, [1910] 36 Stat. 2448 (1911), T.S. No. 548.
21. Polikoff, The Interlake Affair, 3 WASH. MONTHLY 7 (1971) cited in Wyandotte
at 1015 n.4. On the subject of failure of federal conferences, see generally 1 CENTER FOR
STuny Op RESPONSIVE LAW, WATER WASTELAND, ch. X, 5-41 (preliminary draft 1971) [here-
inafter cited as WATER WASTELAND].
* 22. 256 U.S. 296, 301 (1921). Part of the delay is due to the unusual nature of an
original suit: "even when the case is first referred to a master, [the] .. .Court has the
duty of making an independent examination of the evidence, a time-consuming process .... "
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 470 (1907) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). See also
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (eleven years from filing of original bill to
rendition of decision).
23. Wyandotte at 1013.
24. id. at 1009.
25. Id. at 1010.
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constitutional framers have gradually forced the Court to take the posi-
tion that it is an inappropriate body to hear trials involving no federal
issues.
As our social system has grown more complex, the States have
increasingly become emeshed in a multitude of disputes with
persons living outside their borders. Consider, for example, the
frequency with which States and non-residents clash over the
application of state laws concerning taxes, motor vehicles, de-
decents' estates, business torts, government contracts and so
forth. It would, indeed, be anomalous were this Court to be held
out as a potential forum for settling such controversies. 26
John Marshall's broad view that the nature of the parties governs the
grant of original jurisdiction has slowly been eroded to the point reached
in Wyandotte where the Court stated that original jurisdiction "could...
be justified only by the strictest necessity .... ,2" The subject matter of
the suit was appropriate for adjudication; this forum was simply an in-
appropriate place to adjudicate the subject matter.
If Ohio still wishes to bypass the maze of agencies, commissions,
and conferences, they can begin in Ohio courts. The majority noted that
original jurisdiction was technically possible but that no concurrent juris-
diction existed in the federal district courts.28 The Court added, however,
that "under the modern principles of the scope of the subject matter
and in personam jurisdiction, 2 9 Ohio's courts are competent to render
binding judgments against non-resident defendants, including Dow Can-
ada. The gravaman of Ohio's complaint was common law public nui-
sance30 which should not present complicated conflict of law problems.
Furthermore, applicable federal pollution statutes expressly provide that
state action shall not be pre-empted.31
Although the nuisance issues which the complaint presented are
essentially local in nature, there is merit to Justice Douglas' contention
that the solution to the problem will eventually involve federal law. Ohio
may find that basing the abatement action on public nuisance will prove
26. Id. at 1009.
27. Id. at 1013.
28. The fact that there is diversity of citizenship among the parties would not sup-
port district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because that statute does not
deal with cases in which a State is a party. Nor would federal question jurisdiction
exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 .... [An action such as this . . . would have to be
adjudicated under state law.
Wyandotte at 1010 n. 3. Contra, Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971), where it
was held that a state's ecological rights constituted a question arising under the laws of
the United States for determining whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
29. Wyandotte at 1010-11. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945) ; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) ; RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) Or FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
30. Wyandotte at 1016, citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 218.
31. "Nothing in this chapter shall he construed as impairing or in any manner affecting
any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary
waters) of such States." 33 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (1970).
[Vol. XXV
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to be an unwieldy vehicle. Ohio's first obstacle is the necessity of show-
ing no adequate remedy at law to entitle it to equitable relief against the
three chemical manufacturers. The Court's indication of current, ongoing
action by the various state and federal agencies may prove fatal to Ohio's
case, regardless of the alleged ineffectiveness of the agencies. Second,
Ohio's request for damages will present a momumental task of com-
pensation determination. The defendant polluters undoubtedly will at-
tempt to join as co-defendants other polluters of Lake Erie, a number
which conceivably could go as high as several hundred.32 The trial
court would have to apportion damages in accordance with the relative
culpability of each polluter since, under Ohio law, there is no joint
liability and one of the wrongdoers cannot be held liable for the entire
amount of damages.83 If such a state of affairs does come about, Ohio
may have no choice but to reactivate the machinery of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act.84
Ohio's apparent sense of desperation with Lake Erie's noxious con-
dition35 occasioned its attempt to invoke original jurisdiction. A similar
sense of desperation produced the Court's position that original jurisdic-
tion is hopelessly obsolete and not the most efficacious approach to the
problem. The muddled prospects a nuisance suit faces in Ohio courts
could be as deleterious to Lake Erie as a ponderous Court using a special
master. Ohio could once again call for a federal conference on Lake
Erie, although the failure of the last meeting to produce any concrete
results seems to have only increased the sense of frustration leading to
the attempt to invoke original jurisdiction.8" The Court has completely
ruled itself out as a trial court in this crucial area, and until federal
and state officials begin to use existing remedies effectively, the future
for Lake Erie in this regard, and the rest of the environment, is, at best,
dim.
J. WILLIAM WOPAT III
32. 2 WATER WASTELAND, ch. XIV, 33.
33. Mansfield v. Bristor, 76 Ohio St. 270, 81 N.E. 631 (1907).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(d) (1) (1970) provides:
whenever requested by the Governor of any State or a State water pollution con-
trol agency ... the Administrator shall, if such request refers to pollution of waters
which is endangering the health or welfare of persons in a State other than that in
which the discharge or discharges . . . originates . . . shall call promptly a confer-
ence....
35. Lake Erie is an example of an eutrophied lake. . . . Rotting masses of dead
plant life float disgustingly upon the surface . . . some 500 centuries of its natural
life [have] disappear[ed] in less than 25 years under the strain of industrial, agri-
cultural, and municipal pollution.
1 WATER WASTELAND, ch. IV, 8; see also 1 WATER WASTELAND, ch. VI, 8; ch. IX, 2-3.
36. Id. at ch. IX, 2-7. See also 2 WATER WASTELAND, ch. XI, 11-18. On the federal
government's failure to use the River and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-418 (1970), to curb
the pollution of Lake Erie, see 2 WATER WASTELAND, ch. XV, 19-20. President Nixon has
discouraged such action and has instituted a permit program for industry. Exec. Order No.
11574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1970). See also Permits For Discharges Of Deposits Into Navigable
Waters, Proposed Policy, Practice, and Procedure, 35 Fed. Reg. 20005 (1970), 36 Fed. Reg.
983 (1971). In any event, relatively few applications for permits have been received. 2 WATER
WAT LAND, ch. XV, 2-3, 15-18.
